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Articles - Bullying
VIOLENCE
IN SPORT: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE AMATEUR SPORT ORGANIZATION
By Hilary A. Findlay
Presented at
the Symposium "Sports Management: Cutting Edge Strategies For Managing
Sports as a Business", August 2002, Toronto.
Reports of violent
sport incidents are becoming startlingly frequent. In 1996, members
of the University of Moncton hockey team (including players and an assistant
coach) attacked the official over what they perceived to be a controversial
goal at the end of the game.
The National Post
on Friday, August 9, 2002 reported a $10,000 lawsuit filed by a grade
four student against his hockey coach. The young boy alleged the coach
threatened to ‘put a bounty on his head’ during a violent
post-game tirade. The coached denied the allegation saying the student
is simply seeking revenge for being cut from the team. He further alleged
the boy hit his son in the stomach with the butt of his stick at the
end of a game.
At the end of one
of the final games of the season a basketball player within the British
Columbia Colleges Athletic Association threw a water bottle at the official
while shouting and gesturing profanities.
At the conclusion
of a field hockey game during the 1998 Commonwealth Games in Kuala Lumpur,
the Canadian goalie allegedly kicked an opposing Pakistani player kneeling
on the turf in prayer (the goalie maintains he tripped over the other
player accidentally).
Finding examples
of behaviour in sport that we would acknowledge as violent is not difficult.
But they do go to show the breadth of the incidents across many sports,
not just hockey, although hockey is perhaps the most high profile and
prolific. But soccer, football, basketball, and figure skating, among
others, are all involved. And it is not just players committing acts
of violence. Although not as frequent, there have been an alarming number
of violent incidents perpetrated by coaches and by spectators. Violence
by and between players, officials, coaches and spectators have all been
documented -- far too frequently.
Over twenty years
ago, William McMurtry led an inquiry into violence in amateur hockey
[1]. In his report, McMurtry pointed, with some certainty, to what he
believed to be the causes of violence in amateur hockey [2]. Interestingly,
his observations resonate today, perhaps even more vividly.
There is little
empirical data on the effects of this violence, with perhaps the exception
of amateur hockey about which there has been research on spinal injuries.
A study appearing in the March 2000 edition of the Canadian Medical
Association indicated that over 243 severe spinal injuries had occurred
in hockey games over the previous three decades [3]. Those hurt ranged
in age from 11 to 47 years, but more than half were suffered by players
ages 16 to 20 playing competitive hockey. Only six of the 243 were female.
Sixty-three of those incidents that were reported resulted in death
or paralysis. Of that 63, only 2 were reported before 1982, giving some
indication of the extent to which hockey-related injuries have recently
become more severe. Forty percent of the total number of incidents resulted
from the player being hit from behind. Overall, 77 percent occurred
when the player hit the boards. Another 16 percent came as a result
of high-speed collision between two players.
Violence in sport
is a huge and complex topic. This paper takes a judicial look at violence
in sport from both the criminal law and civil law perspectives, applying
the principles underlying judicial decision-making to organizational
policy making in the area. My focus will be on amateur sport (as opposed
to professional sport) and will concentrate on violence by and between
players during competition.
We can look at violence
in sport from any number of perspectives – what causes violence,
who is violent (spectators, coaches, athletes, etc), what is the effect
of violence on the playing field, how do we define violence. I am going
to address violence from a criminal perspective and a civil or tort
perspective, and will also discuss policy implications for the sport
community as a whole, and for individual sport bodies.
The vast majority
of Canadian sport organizations and clubs are ‘private tribunals’.
They are not statutorily based and as such, they are autonomous and
self-governing associations. They have the power to make rules and regulations
that affect people engaged in their activities. Indeed, historically,
the courts have been reluctant to interfere in the affairs of private
tribunals such as sport organizations.
One of the key obligations
of a sport organization is to ensure a safe sport environment –
for both athletes and spectators. In many sports a certain level of
violence is desirable and is, in fact, an inherent part of the sport.
When one participates in such activities it is done with the knowledge
and understanding that a certain amount of violence may occur and that
injury may happen. However, by simply participating in a sport, the
athlete does not consent to all forms of violent activity. The law recognizes
that there are limits as to what one may consent to. This is true whether
we focus on criminal law or civil law.
CRIMINAL
LAW - ASSAULT
Some violent acts
occurring within sporting competitions do attract charges of criminal
assault or the more serious form of assault, assault with a weapon [4].
Section 265 of the Canadian Criminal Code defines assault:
s.265(1) A person
commits an assault when
(a) without the consent of another person, he applies force intentionally
to that person, directly or indirectly;
(b) he attempts or threatens, by an act of gesture, to apply force
to another person, if he has, or causes that other person to believe
upon reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to effect his
purpose;
(c) while openly wearing or carrying a weapon or an imitation thereof,
he accosts or impedes another person or begs.
Section 267 of the
Criminal Code defines assault with a weapon:
s.267(1) Everyone
who, in committing an assault,
(a) carries, uses or threatens to use a weapon or an imitation thereof,
or
(b) causes bodily harm to the complainant,
(c) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding ten years.
(2) For the purposes
of this section and sections 269 and 272, “bodily harm”
means any hurt or injury to the complainant that interferes with the
health or comfort of the complainant and that is more than merely
transient or trifling in nature.
The two key elements
in making out an assault are intention to inflict the force and lack
of consent to the force.
Consent to the force
is a full defense to a charge of assault. Determining what it is one
consents to is very often the most vexing part of any assault matter.
Indeed, can an individual consent to any kind or degree of violence?
In R. v. Jobidon the Supreme Court of Canada said fighting is unlawful
[5], even where the victim of the fight consents to such activity. The
Court did expressly state however, that its decision did not reflect
on “the legality of properly conducted games and sport”.
The law does, however,
impose some limits on consent in sport cases. Two criminal cases are
of particular help in determining the standard of consent [6]. In R.
v. Leclerc [7] the court said participants give “implied
consent to those assaults which are inherent and reasonably incidental
to the normal playing of the game at this level”. By ‘normal
playing of the game’ the court seems to accept as a part of the
game a certain amount of violent action outside the formal rules of
the game. The court also stated that any interpretation of the issue
of consent should be made flexibly having regard to all the conditions
under which the game is played.
In determining whether
the conduct complained of exceeds the scope of an acceptable level of
implied consent, the court in R. v. Cey [8] set out a number
of objective criteria through which consent could be determined. The
list included: the setting of the game, whether the game was part of
league play and the nature of such a league, the age of the players,
conditions under which the game is played, the extent of force employed
and, finally, the degree of risk and probability of serious harm occurring.
Underlying the issue of consent for this court was the risk of injury
and the severity of any potential injury. The reasoning in Cey was applied in the subsequent cases of Leclerc and R. v. Ciccarrelli [9]
In R. v. Leclerc the Court stated at paragraph 25:
The weight of judicial authority appears to be that a player, by participating
in a sport such as hockey, impliedly consents to some bodily contact
necessarily incidental to the game, but not to overtly violent acts,
all of which should be determined according to objective criteria.
Conduct that evinces
a deliberate purpose to inflict injury will generally be held to be
outside the immunity of the scope of implied consent in a sports arena.
The ultimate question of implied consent, as in R. v. Cey,
is whether the crosschecking or push of the complainant across the neck
in close proximity to the boards was so inherently dangerous as
to be excluded from the implied consent [emphasis added].
In Ciccarrelli,
applying the standard set out in R. v. Cey, the court set out
the test of consent as follows:
[There is] such a high risk of injury and distinct probability of harm
as to be beyond what, in fact, the players commonly consent to, or what,
in law they are capable of consenting to.
The court then went
on to apply the criteria set out in Cey and provided greater
detail to the analysis:
- Nature of
the game - professional, fast, competitive, body contact
- Acts and
circumstances - high striking unusual, striking head not reasonable,
blows after whistle unacceptable
- Nature of
act - potential to injure
- State of
mind - retaliatory or intimidation
In all three cases,
the courts recognized that even where a particular level of violence
is expected, and indeed may have been consented to, it may be so inherently
dangerous as to preclude such consent.
It was previously
stated that sport organizations have the ability to make rules to govern
themselves and their activities. Where this does not happen, the courts,
albeit reluctantly, will step in. The cases discussed in this section
give sport organizations some insight into the limits of violent activity
acceptable from a public policy perspective and some parameters for
determining those limits.
It is incumbent
on sport organizations to use these guides in order to determine and
control the level of violent behaviour that may be appropriate or desirable
in any particular program run by the organization. In other words, the
organization needs a clear policy on the level of violence that will
be tolerated and then needs to ensure compliance with such policy initiatives
through rules, officiating, proper coaching and the implementation of
codes of conduct, among other mechanisms.
CIVIL (TORT)
LAW – NEGLIGENCE & LIABILITY
An increasing number
of violent acts occurring during competitive sport events are being
addressed using tort law [10]. For the amateur sport organization, this
avenue of recourse has much broader and dramatic implications. Action
under the criminal law is between the state (i.e., the Crown) and the
perpetrator of the violent act (although not necessarily the specific
outcome or injuries – see the appeal courts decision in Leclerc).
Essentially, what distinguishes a criminal assault from a civil claim
for negligence is the notion of ‘intention’. In an assault
the perpetrator must be shown to have intended the violent act. In a
negligence case, the fact the consequences of the act were not intended
is not relevant. The fact that the perpetrator’s conduct failed
to meet a certain ‘standard of care’ is typically sufficient
to make out a case of negligence (assuming the other elements of negligence
can be met [11]).
While negligence
refers to one’s conduct, liability refers to taking responsibility
for the injury or damages caused by the negligent act. Liability can
be direct or indirect. That is, a party (or parties) maybe held responsible
for their own (negligent) actions. Alternatively, some parties may be
held responsible for the conduct of others. For example, parents can
be held responsible for the conduct of their children, and sport organizations
can be held responsible for the negligent conduct of their employees
or volunteers, including coaches and officials.
The issue of consent
is important in determining civil liability, as it is in the determination
of an assault. It is possible for the victim to have consented to the
violent (and negligent) act that led to the injury. This is the defense
of volenti non fit injuria [12] (‘harm does not come
to one who consents’). The question, of course, as in the case
of an assault, is what was consented to under the circumstances
In the case of Dunn
v. University of Ottawa [13], the court accepted that by participating
in the intercollegiate game of football, Dunn, a punt return specialist,
had consented to a certain degree of violence, but that consent covered
only what might be reasonably expected under the circumstances.
In that decision
at paragraph 36, Mr. Justice Cunningham wrote:
Not every breach
of the rules, by any stretch of the imagination, will result in a
finding of negligence within the context of a game such as football.
Such non-compliance is but one factor in any judicial determination.
Only when there is a deliberate intention to cause injury or a reckless
disregard for the consequences of one’s actions in an uncontrolled
and undisciplined manner will a finding of negligence result.
The Court found
that while a punt return specialist consents to being hit hard by a
tackler, he does not consent (and the player did not consent in this
instance) to “being head butted or speared in the face by an onrushing
225-pound linebacker while in that [i.e., looking up tracking the ball
within the five yard no-tackle zone] vulnerable position”. The
Court found that the actions of the Defendant, in this case, fell far
below the standard that might reasonably have been expected of a university
football player.
In this case the
coach of the Defendant’s team, as well as the University were
also sued. The Plaintiff alleged that the coach “failed to prevent
his staff and players from embarking upon unreasonably dangerous activities
during the course of a football game” and that the University,
as the employer of the coach, was vicariously liable for the coach’s
negligent actions. The Court examined the coach’s responses to
past incidents of violent activity and in this instance found that the
coach had taken reasonable steps to deal with unruly actions and ‘trash-talking’.
The Court did point out that “[w]ithout any doubt, at the university
intercollegiate level, it is the responsibility of the coach to encourage
and teach fair play and good sportsmanship. The game is played to win,
but it is not played to win at all costs”. In summary, the Court
found that while there might well be circumstances under which a coach
could be held responsible for the actions of a player, this case was
not one of them.
Those in positions of authority within the sport organization need to
be concerned about their own actions but as well, the conduct of those
for whom they have some responsibility. In particular, sport managers
need to be concerned with the conduct of program participants, coaches
and officials. The level of violence one sees in many competitions has
as much to do with coaching technique and attitude and officiating behaviour
as it has to do with the actions of a handful of players. Ultimately,
the sport organization is responsible for the ‘tone’ set
by those controlling the competition.
It is important
to note that when courts examine the issue of consent (whether in the
criminal or civil context) they have considered whether a rule of play
has been breached, and the nature and origin of that rule. The courts
recognize that some rules have been in place as a direct response to
safety concerns, arising usually as a result of a historical analysis
of injury trends. For example, between 1966 and 1987 in the game of
hockey in Canada, there were 117 cervical spine and spinal cord injuries
[14]. Twenty six of the injuries resulted from hits from behind near
the boards. In response to these statistics, the Canadian Amateur Hockey
Association introduced the ‘no checking from behind rule’
in 1984. It is notable that the courts in both Cey and Leclerc both recognized this rule and differentiated it from other rules of
the game as a “safety rule”.
A similar distinction
has been made by the courts involving other sports. (For example, in
the case of Dunn v. University of Ottawa described above, the
Court recognized the ‘five yard non-encroachment rule’ on
punt returns as a safety rule. In the case of Hamstra v. B.C. Rugby
Union [15], which involved the collapse of a ‘scrum’
in a game being played by junior rugby players, the Court noted that
other jurisdictions had modified the scrum rules for junior players
for safety reasons. The courts clearly take a different view of those
rules established for safety purposes, and the breaches of such rules,
than they do of other rules of the game.
While the courts
are prepared to give substantial deference to the internal rules and
standards governing a particular sport or event, they are not prepared
to blindly accept any standard. In Dyck v. Manitoba Snowmobile Association [16] at p. 106, Mr. Justice Kroft stated that, even where an association
might follow its usual procedures and such procedures are common practice
within the sport, if those procedures are unreasonable, given the circumstances,
the court will not hesitate in finding such conduct negligent. Similarly,
in Hamstra v. B.C. Rugby Union, the court took note of rule
modifications made in other Commonwealth jurisdictions (but not in the
province of British Columbia – or elsewhere in Canada) for safety
reasons. The Court warned the Union that, now knowing about the use
of these rule modifications in other jurisdictions, if a similar accident
occurred in B.C. in the absence of such modification, the Court would
view the matter much differently.
A POLICY
APPROACH TO VIOLENCE IN SPORT
The preceding section
is a cursory overview of the law regarding violence in sport. So what
should a sport manager take from this information?
Sport organizations
play an integral role in controlling the game through their own policies
and rules and those of their governing bodies. A sport organization
in fact has significant, if not ultimate control over the level of violent
conduct tolerated within its purview and it exercises this control (or
abrogates control) through its own rules, regulations and policies.
Clearly, where a sport organization abrogates control, other venues
of judicial control will step in.
The Concise Oxford
Dictionary (New Edition) defines policy as “prudent conduct; course
or general plan of action”. Policy allows an organization to determine
what it is about, what its goals are, what its objectives are and how
it will achieve those goals and objectives. Good policy provides a type
of ‘road map’ for an organization ensuring that its destination
(i.e., the substantive goals and objectives of the organizations and
its programs) are clear and the road to reaching those ends are also
clear and consistent with the philosophy and objectives of the organization.
Problems typically arise where an organization is not clear in its vision,
where its objectives compete with one another and where there is a tension
or ambiguity between the substantive ends for an organization and the
procedural means of getting there.
Policy is very much
influenced by the values, beliefs and interests of those within the
organization. Indeed organizational policies often reflect a mix of
the values, beliefs and interests of an organization’s members
– sometimes conflicting, sometimes ambiguous, sometimes vague
and incomplete – and sometimes, non-existent.
Hobart Burch in
his book “The Why’s of Social Policy” [17]
identifies three categories of policies that typically operate within
an organization and can certainly be identified within the context of
the sport organization. These are firstly, the intended or duly adopted
policies of the organization; secondly the unintended policies that
simply evolve over time and, thirdly, a lack of policy, which in itself
may make a policy statement and thus has been included as a category
Fully intended and
duly adopted policies Burch describes as de jure policies. De jure means “from the law”. These are policies
or rules that are written in an organization’s constitution or
bylaws, in its procedural or policy manuals, or in various forms of
contracts and agreements. For example, many sport organizations have de jure polices on conduct, selection, appeals, harassment,
hiring, firing, benefits, and financial management, to name but a few.
Unintended policies
are described as de facto policies where de facto means, “from what is done”. These polices evolve over time
as ‘common practices’ of the organization and may, over
time, acquire the same force and effect (at law) as the de jure policies.
Unfortunately, they also typically arise as a consequence of a ‘bending’
of an official or de jure policy that may no longer be appropriate
or workable. In other words, de facto policy is often evidence of a
neglect of de jure policy.
The third category
of policy is no policy at all. Burch calls this “default”
policy; default meaning a failure to act. Typically, default policy
reinforces the status quo and reflects the vested interests of those
in control at the time. Default policy is the most difficult to deal
with – as noted by Burch, “how do you get a grip on empty
air? Default policy reflects acts of omission rather than acts of commission.
It also often reflects a ‘willful blindness’ on the part
of the organization.
When it comes to
looking at how internal policies of sport organizations currently address
the issue of violence, it is fair to say that there is little evidence
of de jure policy but abundant evidence of de facto and default policy.
Nonetheless, we
have seen some isolated examples of encouraging policy responses. For
example, safety rules are being incorporated into a number of sports
such as football and hockey, as previously described, or are being implemented
at different age or skill levels within a particular sport, such as
rugby and boxing. Many sport organizations have adopted ‘zero
tolerance’ codes of conduct for players and parents, and others
have required all participants, including parents, to sign ‘fair
play contracts’ [18]. These measures are reactions to specific
safety and conduct problems. However they are ad-hoc responses -- what
is needed is a more comprehensive approach to policy that stems from
an explicit consideration of the organization’s philosophy and
values, and reflects these at all times and throughout all aspects of
the organization’s operations.
To be effective
such a concerted policy response must come both from the top (that is,
from a national perspective) and from the grassroots (that is, from
individual organizations and clubs). The amateur sport community as
a whole needs to take and promote a position on violence in sport. At
the same time, each sport discipline and each sport club needs to translate
that vision and put it into effect in their own circumstances, meaning
that they must develop new policy around violent conduct and possibly
adapt existing policies on issues related to conduct to ensure that
there is consistency of outcomes.
There is widespread
agreement that the incidence of violence in amateur sport is increasing
and is unacceptable. The issue needs to be addressed generally, across
amateur sport (and professional sport as well), and must be dealt with
more specifically by individual sports and sport organizations. The
British sport system, through its national Sports Council, has recognized
this need for a two-tiered approach. In response to a discussion paper
put forward by its Law Commission on consent in the criminal law, the
U.K. Sports Council [19] submitted that sport was a special case when
dealing with the issue of consent to violent acts. The Council’s
policy response is insightful and is quoted in part below:
Given the impracticality
of trying to establish through law a common standard against which
the conduct of participants in all, or any, sports may, for legal
purposes be assessed, all governing bodies of sport should be encouraged
to review the rules or laws of their sport (and, indeed, their deterrent
disciplinary procedures) so as to ensure that participants are provided
with the greatest, reasonable degree of protection from injury capable
of being caused by another participant acting recklessly or with intent
to cause injury.
This is a promising
start.
On the Canadian
scene, progress is also being made. In February 1999 the Canadian Centre
for Ethics in Sport produced a discussion paper on violence in sport
entitled “Building a New Brand of Sport – What About Violence”
[20] . While there may not be consensus on the points advanced in this
paper, at least it represents a starting point for discussion by the
Canadian sport community at large.
Other jurisdictions
have taken their own legislative approaches to the issue of violence
in sport. For example, a large number of American state jurisdictions
have taken specific steps through legislation to punish the player,
coach, or spectator who assaults a sports official [21].
The work does not
stop here. Each individual sport organization has a responsibility to
take steps to deal with violence in their own programs and within their
own jurisdictions. The courts have acknowledged that coaches have a
responsibility for directing training and competitive activities. On
his or her own, the coach has the greatest potential to influence behaviour
and attitude ‘on the field’. But, the organization has the
ultimate responsibility to ensure the right values – the values
the organization has adopted – are reflected in the actions of
coaches, officials, athletes, parents, spectators and other participants
in the organization’s programs.
One of the greatest
challenges here is ensuring that values are reflected consistently.
For example, far too often we see a sport program or team promoting
itself as being all-inclusive and developmental, and yet, when the championship
game looms on the horizon, the team reverts to a more aggressive and
competitive ‘win at all costs’ model, either as a result
of coaching style or as a result of pressure from parents or players.
Another area where there is often inconsistency is within the internal
rules of the organization. A dramatic example of this can be seen in
hockey where a number of leagues impose a suspension on any coach who
removes a team from play, and yet there have been times when a responsible
coach has felt a compelling need, for safety reasons, to remove a team
from a particularly violent or mismatched game.
This brings me full
circle back to the 9-year old boy’s lawsuit against an opposing
team’s coach. Whether you agree or disagree with the allegations,
what’s conspicuously absent from this picture is the local minor
hockey association responsible for this boy, his parents, his team,
and this coach. How did this matter get this far? The association could
have, and should have, had mechanisms available to deal with this conduct,
and should have implemented them in a timely and firm fashion.
[1] McMurtry, William
R., Q.C. (Commissioner), 1974. Investigation and Inquiry into Violence
in Amateur Hockey. Ministry of Community and Social Services, Government
of Ontario.
[2] These reasons include (1) the influence of professional hockey with
its emphasis on winning and use of violence as a tactical instrument to
achieve that goal; (2) a rule structure (in professional and amateur hockey)
which not only tolerates violence but encourages its use by rewarding
those who excel in physical intimidation -- it also makes reciprocal violence
inevitable; (3) lack of any proper definition of the purpose and objectives
of amateur hockey, with its own model and rule structure; (4) failure
of referees to apply existing rules, and inconsistency and lack of support
for referees from fans, coaches and players; (5) failure of coaches to
control players, and an emphasis on winning games rather than instilling
the true value of sport and developing skills; (6) a lack of respect of
players for rules and officials; and (7) undue pressure from parents,
fans and coaches with over-emphasis on winning.
[3] Charles H. Tator, James D. Carson and Robert Cushman, (2000) 'Hockey
Injures the Spine in Canada, 1966-1996' Canadian Medical Association Journal.
162(6) p. 787-788
[4] Assault is distinguished from a charge of criminal negligence where
the likelihood of harm is disregarded. Mr. Justice Gonthier. in R. v.
Jobidon (1988) 45 C.C.C. (3d) 176, 67 C.R. (3d) 183, 30 O.A.C. 172 (Ont.
Dist. Ct.) distinguished the two criminal activities this way: "The conscious
regard for some level of harmful consequence to the physical integrity
of another person distinguishes assault from criminal negligence, where
there is actually a disregard for the likely impact of one's conduct on
the other's physical safety."
[5] The Supreme Court recognized the purpose of the Criminal Code is to
protect the public and stated quite clearly that there was no public policy
initiative served by fighting.
[6] The courts have described various standards of consent: R. v. Maki
(1970) 3 O.R. 780; 14 D.L.R. (3d) 164 (Prov. Ct.) defined it in terms
of the degree of violence - "malicious, unprovoked, overt use of violence";
R. v. Maloney (1976), 28 C.C.C. (2d) 323 (Ont. Co. Ct.), players consent
to the risks that are inherent and incidental to the game including where
the body contacts board and possibly in fights where both players consent
to the fight; R. v. Leyte (1973), C.C.C. (2d) 458 (Ont. Prov. Ct.), in
competitive sport a player is deemed to consent to hits occurring in many
ways so long as the reactions of the players are instructive and closely
related to the play whether or not a foul is committed".
[7] R. v. Leclerc (1991) 7 C.R. (4th) 282, 4 O.R. (3d) 788, 67 C.C.C (3d)
563, 50 O.A.C. 232 (C.A.)
[8] R. v. Cey (1989), 48 C.C.C. (3d) 480, [1989] 5 W.W.R. 169, 75 Sask.
R. 53
[9] R. v. Ciccarelli (1989), 54 C.C.C. (3d) 121 (Ont. Dist. Ct.)
[10]Within the professional sport context, athletes are loathe to use
this avenue of recourse, particularly, and understandably where the athlete
remains an active participant. Peer pressure, fears of retaliation, and
the possibility of parties becoming team-mates at some point in the future
all mitigate to make the chances of a civil suit, at least against another
player, remote. This is not so much the case in the amateur ranks, particularly
where the purpose and philosophy underlying the competition differ from
professional sport.
[11] The four elements of negligence are: a duty of care is owed; the
duty imposes a certain standard of care; an injury or damage occurs and,
the damage or injury is as a result of a breach in the standard of care.
[12] Black's Law Dictionary in definition of the maxim demonstrates that
certain criteria must be met for consent to be valid. This is the basis
of the whole concept of a 'waiver'. Black's describes the maxim as follows:
"if one, knowing and comprehending the danger, voluntarily exposes himself
to it, though not negligent in so doing, he is deemed to have assumed
the risk and is precluded from a recovery for an injury resulting therefrom".
[13] Dunn v. University of Ottawa (1995) Ont. Ct. of Justice (Gen. Div.).
Unreported. OJ 2865
[14] The Court in the civil case Unruh v. Webber quoted hockey related
injury statistics kept by the Canadian Sports Spine and Head Injury Research
Injury Centre at the University of Toronto. Between 1975 and 1987 that
Centre documented 107 spinal injuries, 99 percent of which occurred in
organized games, 87 percent were injuries to the neck and 81 percent came
as a result of the injured player hitting the boards.
[15] Hamstra v. British Columbia Rugby Union (1989) 1 C.C.L.T. (2d) 78
(B.C.S.C.)
[16] Dyck v. Manitoba Snowmobile Association (1985) 1 S.C.R. 589; affg.
(1982) 4 W.W.R. 318, 21 C.C.L.T. 38, 136 D.L.R. (3d) 111 (Man. C.A.)
[17] Burch, H.A. (1991). The Why’s of Social Policy. NY: Praeger
[18] In 1994 the Dartmouth Whalers Minor Hockey Association introduced a fair play program to reduce verbal and physical abuse in the game. This program has served as a model for a number of other programs throughout the country and includes player, parent and coach contracts, a 'Rink Behaviour Policy' with posters warning arena
spectators that they will be ejected for verbal or physical abuse, formalized coach selection processes, fair play team awards, junior officiating programs and a fair play support team.
[19] United Kingdom Sports Council submission to the United Kingdom Law Commission. (1994, July)
[20] Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport Discussion Paper on Violence in Sport, (1999, February). Building a new brand of sport - what about violence?
[21] Cross, Troy (1998). 'Assaults on Sports Officials'. Marquette Sports Law Journal, Vol. 8 No. 2, 429-454.
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